Evolution and the theory of games, spring 2013
Evolution and the theory of games, spring 2013
A game is a mathematical model of a situation of conflict of interests in which the optimal strategy for one player not only depends on his own decisions but also on the decisions of his opponents. The course is an introduction to game theory with emphasis on applications in evolutionary and behavioural biology.
Lecturer
Scope
10 cu.
Type
Advanced studies
Lectures
Weeks 3-9 and 11-18, Monday 14-16 and Wednesday 14-16 in room C122. Two hours of exercise classes per week.
Easter holiday 28.3.-3.4.
Exams
Exam date: 14th of May at 14.00 in room B322. (Notice the change of the room!)
Bibliography
Lecture notes are available in pdf version below.
Exercise groups
Group | Day | Time | Place | Instructor |
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1. | Thursday | 10-12 | C122 | Tadeas Priklopil |
Feedback
Below you will find a link to a feedback page, where you can express (anonymously) your thoughts about the course. In particular, it would be interesting to know whether some topics dealt in the course were too superficial/too detailed, or whether you have suggestions for future topics, or whether the course material should be improved (and if so, in which way), or etc.. ALL COMMENTS ARE WELCOME!
Link to the feedback page (note that the textbox can be enlarged by dragging the bottom right corner)
Lecture notes and topics:
Lecture notes (latest update 27.4.):
| lecture topics - period III | exercises | solutions |
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week 3 | 16.1. An introduction |
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week 4 | 21.1. Dominated strategies, mixed strategies |
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week 5 | 28.1. More solution concepts, Nash equilibrium | ||
| 30.1. Nash existence theorem, Bishop-Cannings theorem |
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week 6 | 4.2. Evolutionary stable strategies |
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| 6.2. ESS + propositions |
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week 7 | 11.2. The evolution of sex the ratio | ||
| 13.2. Infinite strategic form + War of attrition |
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week 8 | 18.2. War of attrition and Hawk-Dove game; Asymmetric games | No Exercises |
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| 20.2. Asymmetric games, examples |
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week 9 | 25.2. Lecture cancelled | ||
| 27.2. Recapitulation + games |
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week 10 - no lectures
| lecture topics - period IV | exercises | solutions |
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week 11 | 11.3. Public good game + iterated games |
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| 13.3. Iterated games, examples | No exercises |
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week 12 | 18.3. Iterated games, formal description + properties |
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| 20.3. Iterated games, formal description + properties CONTINUES |
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week 13 | 25.3. Iterated games - theorems |
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| 27.3. Subgame perfection | no exercises (Easter holiday) |
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week 14 | 1.4. No lecture (Easter holiday) |
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| 3.4. No lecture (Easter holiday) |
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week 16 | 8.4. Subgame perfection and other NE refinements |
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| 10.4. Trembling-hand Perfect NE, IPD with mistakes | ||
week 17 | 15.4. IPD with mistakes, Signalling games |
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| 17.4. Signalling games, Multi-stage games | ||
week 18 | 22.4. Signalling games, Multi-stage games |
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| 24.4. Recap + IPD tournament ( ) |