

EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES

Exercises 18-4-2013

25. Consider a game of two players depicted in Figure 1.

(a) (3 points) What are the (pure) Nash equilibria of the game? Hint: write the strategies for player 1 as "if at the first node play x , if at the third node play y ".

(b) (3 points) How many subgames does the game have?

(c) (3 points) What are the SPNE?




FIGURE 1.

26. (4 points) Consider the game-tree depicted in Figure 2. In the lecture we calculated the pure Nash equilibria and the THPNE. Are there any FSPNE?




FIGURE 2.

27. Consider the game depicted in Figure 3.

- (a) (3 points) What are the pure Nash equilibria?
- (b) (3 points) How many subgames there are?
- (c) (3 points) What are the SPNE?
- (d) (3 points) What are the FPNE?
- (e) (3 points) What are the TPNE?




FIGURE 3.