

10.1. Assume $D(x^*) = 0$ and $D(x) = \left. \frac{\partial}{\partial y} S_x(y) \right|_{y=x}$

a.) Show that x^* is evolutionary stable

if:
$$\left. \frac{\partial^2}{\partial y^2} S_x(y) \right|_{y=x^*} < 0.$$

A singular strategy is evol. stable if no initially rare mutant can invade

$\Leftrightarrow S_{x^*}(y) < 0$ for all $y \neq x^*$.

Since $S_{x^*}(x^*) = 0$, it is a maximum.

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial S_x(y)}{\partial y^2} < 0. \quad (*)$$

b.) For a singular to be convergence stable, the selection gradient must point towards the singular strategy \rightarrow it changes sign from positive to negative when going through x^* .

$$\text{So } D(x) = \left. \frac{\partial S_x(y)}{\partial y} \right|_{y=x} < 0$$

$$\frac{dD(x)}{dx} = \left. \frac{\partial^2 S}{\partial x \partial y} \right|_{y=x} + \left. \frac{\partial^2 S}{\partial y^2} \right|_{y=x} < 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \left. \frac{dD(x)}{dx} \right|_{x=x^*} = \left. \frac{\partial^2 S}{\partial x \partial y} \right|_{y=x^*} + \left. \frac{\partial^2 S}{\partial y^2} \right|_{y=x^*} < 0 \quad (o)$$

c.) For evolutionary branching we need convergence stability of singularity, but not evolutionary stability

\Rightarrow (o) should hold

\Rightarrow (*) should NOT hold

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial^2 S_x(y)}{\partial x \partial y} < 0.$$

10.2.

• exponential growth rate of mutant:

$$f(x_m) - \alpha(x_m - x_r)\hat{N}_r$$

• resident's equilibrium density:

$$\hat{N}_r = \frac{-ax_r + b}{1 - \frac{1}{1+\nu}}$$

- For x^* to be singular, we need $D(x^*) = 0$.

- Exponential growth rate of mutant differentiated w.r.t. x_m :

$$(1.) \quad -a + (-k) \cdot (-1) \cdot \frac{\nu \exp(\dots)}{(1 + \nu \exp(\dots))^2} \cdot \frac{(-ax_r + b)}{1 - \frac{1}{1+\nu}} \quad \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{evaluate} \\ \text{at:} \\ x_r = x_m = x^* \end{array} \right.$$

$$= \dots = -a \frac{\nu k (-ax^* + b)}{\nu (1 + \nu)}$$

What's above is linear for $x^* \rightarrow$ a unique solution for it being zero exists.

Differentiating (1.) further w.r.t. x_m :

~~$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x_m} \left(-a + (-k) \cdot (-1) \cdot \frac{\nu \exp(\dots)}{(1 + \nu \exp(\dots))^2} \cdot \frac{(-ax_r + b)}{1 - \frac{1}{1+\nu}} \right) \quad \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{evaluate} \\ \text{at:} \\ x_r = x_m = x^* \end{array} \right.$$

$$= \dots = \frac{2k^2 (-ax^* + b)}{\nu (1 + \nu)^2}$$~~

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x_m^2} S_{x_r}(x_m) = \dots \propto \frac{k^2 (-\nu + \nu^2)}{(1 + \nu \exp)^3}$$

positive when $\nu > 1$, and negative before that.

b.) Construct a decreasing function p such that there is a singular trait value that is not convergence stable.

Assume we have a growth rate function g at singularity, we need.

$$g'(x^*) = \frac{-vk}{v(1+v)} g(x^*)$$

Also, we need conditions from ex. 10.1. b to be satisfied in this singularity.

10.3.

	Coop	Defect
Coop	$B - C$	$-C$
Defect	B	0

$B > B - C \Rightarrow$ Coop is not an ESS

$0 > -C \Rightarrow$ Defect is an ESS

Can there be a mixed strategy

$\begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{pmatrix} = p$? For such we would have:

$$\begin{cases} (Ap)_1 = (B - C)p_1 - Cp_2 = D & (\text{some constant}) \\ (Ap)_2 = Bp_1 = D \end{cases}$$

But for such system no positive solution exists

\Rightarrow Defect is the only ESS!

10.4.

2x2 matrix games

	R_1	R_2
R_1	a	b
R_2	c	d

- When is R_1 an ESS? When $a > c$
- R_2 is ESS when $d > b$

• mixed ESS? $\begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1-p \end{pmatrix} = \underline{p}$

$$(A \underline{p})_1 = (A \underline{p})_2 \Rightarrow pa + (1-p)b = pc + (1-p)d$$

$$\Rightarrow p = \frac{d-b}{a-b-c+d} \quad \leftarrow \text{a candidate!}$$

- Is $p \in]0,1[$?

- Is the other ESS condition satisfied?

$$p A q > q A q$$

q is a strategy other than p .

$$\Leftrightarrow pq a + p(1-q)b + (1-p)qc + (1-p)(1-q)d > q^2 a + q(1-q)b + (1-q)qc + (1-q)^2 d$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (p-q) [q(a-b-c+d) + b-d] > 0$$

$$(p-q) [(a-b-c+d)(q-p)]$$

$$= -(q-p)^2 [a-b-c+d]$$

$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\leftarrow}$ This has to be negative

$$\Rightarrow \text{for } p \in]0,1[\quad d-b < 0$$

$$\Rightarrow a < c$$

10.5.

Find all ESS of game

	R_1	R_2	R_3
R_1	0	5	-4
R_2	-7	0	8
R_3	-1	2	0

pure ESS's: only R_1 is a pure ESS.

Subcorollary of Bishop-Cannings-theorem states that if p^* is ESS \rightarrow if q is such that $\text{supp}(q) \subseteq \text{supp}(p^*)$
 $\rightarrow q$ is not an ESS.

~~\rightarrow No full strategy can be ESS or a pair of strategies that contain R_1 can be ESS.~~

\rightarrow Only mixed strategies $\{R_2, R_3\}$ can be ESS.

\rightarrow Let $\underline{p} = \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1-p \end{pmatrix}$

$$\begin{aligned} (1-p)8 &= p2 \\ 8 &= 10p \\ p &= \frac{8}{10} \Rightarrow 1-p = \frac{2}{10} \end{aligned}$$

\rightarrow Is $\underline{p} A q > q A q$ for all $q = \begin{pmatrix} q_1 \\ q_2 \\ q_3 \end{pmatrix}$

$$p \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 5q_2 - 4q_3 \\ -7q_1 + 8q_3 \\ -1q_1 + 2q_2 \end{pmatrix} > q_1(5q_2 - 4q_3) + q_2(-7q_1 + 8q_3) + q_3(-q_1 + 2q_2)$$

$$\frac{8}{10}(-7q_1 + 8q_3) + \frac{2}{10}(-q_1 + 2q_2) > \dots$$

We see that for $q = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ this does not hold. \rightarrow not an ESS!